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"People Should Come to Work":
Un-becoming Cartesian Subjects
and Objects in Art Education

Sara Wilson McKay

When asked about how he wants viewers to engage with his often
confrontational and difficult work, performance artist William Pope. L
responded, "people should come to work" (personal communication,
February 3, 2003). Preparedness to engage, to work, is at the core of
considering the connection of art education and democracy. All too
often that connection is reduced to the idea of beauty being in the "eye
of the beholder" and you can do whatever you want-flit's a free
country!"
Re-imagining the work of art education, I want to talk of rhizomes
and cyborgs, perhaps at the risk of alienating readers with raised
eyebrows and being accused of hiding behind nouveau metaphors

d'jour. But I want to argue for these metaphors because as Nietzsche
(1979) suggested, metaphors have life spans: once a metaphor dies, it
is time for a new metaphor. The rhizome and the cyborg do what
metaphors help us do; think creatively and imaginatively about a
previously known idea-in this case the Cartesian seeing subject and
seen object. Too frequently art education and democracy get linked at
the most superficial level. I argue for new complex metaphors, which
require work, to help us understand the relationship of these ideas on
a more profound level.
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This essay examines the role of the eye of the beholder within art
education. The eye here is never simply functioning as a "neutral"
process of seeing, but rather it is the contemporary, politically-situated
eye. How we see, what we choose to notice, recognize and perceive is
very much a political act, one intrinsically linked to ideas of democracy.
The association of vision with identification, definition and
representation surely has larger implications than just what it means
to see and be seen. Could what we see and not see (i.e. how we see)
playa major role in what constructs the social status quo and continued
undemocratic political arenas? How might art education figure into
this equation? In what follows, I suggest two metaphors that can be
powerful tools for re-envisioning ideas of socio-political art education.

The Role of Conflict in Critical Education: What Does It
Mean to Work?
Reconceptualizing vision in order to open up new metaphors with
implications for understandings of democracy, bell hooks (1995)
explored in her book, Art on my mind: Visual politics, how to invent a
decolonized self who can envision democratic freedom through art.
In her pursuit of democratic participation, she demanded, "There must
be a revolution in the way we see, the way we look" (p. 4). hooks further
described this revolution of visual politics as beginning with "diverse
programs of critical education that would stimulate collective
awareness" (p.4). The current age of US mind-numbing standardized
test-prep seems to undermine critical education that would stimulate
such collective awareness.
But awareness is not enough; there has to be new creation, the
doing of something new. John Dewey (1916) suggested tha t democra tic
education is characterized by novel communication among varied social
groups. Further, it is the belief that, "every individual brings with him
[sic] ... a new way of seeing and feeling that in its interaction with old
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material creates something new, something previously not existing in
experience" (Dewey, 1934, p. 108). A re-visioned understanding of
democratic education also involves a solid pursuit of social justice:
"democratic educators seek not simply to lessen the harshness of social
inequities in schools, but to change the conditions that create them"
(Apple & Beane, 1995, p. 11).
The novel doing that democratic education requires is typically
squelched by monocular vision, perpetuating the status quo of
unquestioned cultural reproduction commonly known as public
education. We are all too familiar with the status quo in educationpublic education that fails to meet the needs of all students and provide
opportunities for all students to be successful. Annually, as reports of
standardized tests fill the pages of the newspapers, it is increasingly
apparent that democratic education is really less of an educational goal
than the hollow pursuit of numbers and percentiles. The current
educational system is limited to the pursuit of Truth (capital T intended),
that is somehow quantifiable and definable through our usual,
normalized envisionings. These visions of "truth" seem to have "arisen
from some immutable, infallible source" (Apple & Beane, 1995, p. 13).
The status quo begs for new metaphors to dislodge the reified mythical
truths.
In his discussion of power /knowledge marked by their
"constitutive interdependence" (p. 239), Foucault (1980) urged us to
ask questions about what creates regimes of truth, not in hopes of
escaping them, but so that we can change them. The questioning of
Cartesian monocular vision is one attempt to isolate a large force in
creating unthinking regimes of truth. The implicit trust of the eye and
what it defines as knowledge is just such a factor in creating regimes of
truth that must be questioned.
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Cartesian Seeing Subjects/Seen Objects
But from where did this knowledge-producing eye come?
Descartes claims: "all knowledge is of the same nature throughout,
and consists solely in combining what is self evident" (in Lloyd, 1989,
p. 115). That which is "self-evident" to the eye is that which has
imprisoned us in attitudes of knowing that require external
authoritative structures. This external authority may take shape in
categorical designations that disallow ambiguous knowing or it may
simply be "that which is on the test." Either way, being told what and
how to know supersedes experiential knowing; the latter frequently
results in murky, unclear, non-categorical knowledge which is often
less comfortable and requires more work.
Lorraine Code (1991) expertly traces the origins of what is deemed
"self-evident" to "visual metaphors-knowledge as illumination,
knowledge as seeing, truth as light" (p. 140) at the root of Platonic
philosophy. However she also recognizes that "a dual sense of vision
is operative ... Vision at once severs the object from the subject through
perceptual distance, and [yetl connects subject and object across a
perceptual distance" (p. 141). The resounding effect in this schema of
perceptual epistemology is that of distance between subject and object.
Unpacking Foucault's "truths," requires an analysis of our
inheritance from Rene Descartes with regard to this distance: the
subject-object split. In Western philosophy, the cogito, "I think,"
establishes a dualistic condition between mind and matter. This
"Cartesian split" also results in a split between the perceiver and the
perceived, the legacy of which lies in terms of a seeing subject and a
seen object (Jay, 1993). Thus a Cartesian worldview has reduced visual
worlds to a singular visual field and consigned the body to objecthood
in it.
The impact of the Cartesian world view on discourse about vision
valorizes the privileged objective eye that Plato conceptualized, and
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fortifies the Western subject-object split yielding an institution of
domination, hierarchy and exclusion. With such a strongly acculturated
world view behind it, vision, particularly the gaze, has no doubt been
manifested in an array of power-lobbying ways: the gaze controls; the
gaze is not neutral; the gaze perpetuates patriarchy; the gaze claims
epistemic relations. Clearly, an un-becoming of Cartesian seeing
subjects and seen objects is required, but how do we begin?

Intersubjectivity and Art Education
A discussion of Cartesian perspectivism and its distance from
experience begs the question of what might transpire if we begin to
conceptualize something other than domination within a subject-object
dichotomy. What happens to vision within an intersubjective
world view as a new millennium ushers in the explosion of the virtual
world where experience is an evolving concept? One cannot ask this
question without thinking of Donna Haraway's ground-breaking essay
"A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-feminism in
the Late Twentieth Century" (1994). In this essay, Haraway calls for a
feminist renegotiation of the visual through which the visual field is
imploded:
From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about
lived social and bodily realities in which people are not
afraid of their kinship with animals and machines, not afraid
of permanently partial identities and contradictory
standpoints. The political struggle is to see from both
perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations
and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point.
Single vision produces worse illusions than double vision
or many-headed monsters (p. 429).
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She goes on to define the cyborg as "a kind of disassembled and
reassembled postmodern collective and personal self" (p. 437); identities
give way to woven, networked affinities and the politics of partiality
are bound up with intersubjectivity and vision: "the topography of
subjectivity is multidimensional; so therefore is vision" (p.193).
Art can be instrumental in breaking down the Cartesian split by
requiring of us multipliCity in our visions and an extension of who we
have defined ourselves to be. Art plays itself out through multiple
connections and ruptures-connections by virtue of its multiple
interpretations over time and space and ruptures within our perceptions
of easy recognition, which jolt us out of our complicity. Feminist theorist
Teresa de Lauretis (1988) asserted the necessity of aesthetic texts to
help us "see difference differently" (p. 184) meaning artworks can help
us explore and value that which is difficult to categorize. Film theorist
Kaja Silverman (1996) maintained that artworks, "can intervene where
we cannot. .. [and] at the same time, they are available to scrutiny and
interrogation" (p. 4). These ideas about art suggest that indeed the
field of art education holds great potential for the un-becoming of
limited Cartesian vision and its implications.
There are many reasons why examining the undemocratic effects
of limited vision should take place within art education. In my
experience, students tend to hesitate when they are asked to comment
about their observations of a work of art. They are unsure of the
quantifiable "right" answer that they feel they should know or at least
be able to arrive at through some formulaic and reliable act of
observation. They feel extreme discomfort that their usually powerful
eye, skilled in the act of recognition, is somehow failing them. Rarely
do educators point out that the processes of schooling, including several
aspects of art education, are largely based upon a dismissal of
complexity in favor of definitive looking. Even though art education
is a discipline born of the multiplicity and complexity of art, often
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educators give into the systems' (be they education or larger social
institutions) and our students' resistance to ambiguity and multiple
meanings by telling students what to see and how to see it. Opening
up our vision to different views and beyond certainty asks us to explore
a philosophy of alterity, of difference.

A Philosophy of Alterity & Rhizomatic Anding
British literary scholar Thomas Docherty (1996) refutes the
Cartesian world view as a philosophy of identity, which is characterized
by its pursuits of the categorical, a lack of the political, and a dismissal
of temporal change (pp. 19-35). This valorizing of the homogenous is
countered by Docherty'S postmodern proposal of a philosophy of
alterity or difference. He, like other vision scholars (e.g. Jay 1993, Levin
1993), acknowledges the proliferation of a philosophy of identity
through issues of vision, which have grand repercussions for
epistemology:
here the eye is the location of truth. But, more importantly,
truth is in an eye which is marked with a specific kind of
power, fundamentally the power to reduce alterity to
identity... Such an eye cannot see alterity at all, in fact; rather,
it sees only a mirrored reflection of the self, or it so
successfully interiorizes alterity as to reduce it to identity.
(pp. 104-5)
A philosophy of identity is what keeps the subject-object
dichotomy in operation by employing a sense of definition, a necessity
of reductionism. A philosophy of alterity, on the other hand, creates
opportunities to engage in the political and the possibilities of change.
Docherty'S philosophy of difference resonates strongly with Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari's conception of the rhizome. In their
collaborative thinking, rhizomatic grass is preferred to hierarchical trees:
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a rhizome doesn't begin and doesn't end, but is always in
the middle, between things, inter-being, intermezzo. The
tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, exclusively
alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the rhizome
is woven together with conjunctions: 'and ... and ... and ... '
(1983, p. 57)

The defining feature of a rhizome is its connection and
heterogeneity: any point on a rhizome can be connected with any other.
There are ruptures in rhizomes (or lines of flight) but these become
part of the rhizome. For example, "we can never get rid of ants, because
they form an animal rhizome that never ceases to reconstitute itself,
even when almost completely destroyed" (p. 18). The rhizome enacts
difference and seeks multiplicity.
Another way of understanding the rhizome metaphor is through
the AND. The conjunction "and" has profound significance in both the
work of John Dewey and Deleuze and Guattari because of the
privileging of a conjunctive method of understanding relations. They
are interested in the interconnectedness, the interpenetrations of
emerging conjunctions rather than attempting to fix identities with
equalities. It is not that these conjunctions are predetermined or
dualistic linkings of bipolar oppositions, but rather that the connectivity
of concepts is predicated on an immanent inseparability of concepts.
Of Dewey's many publications during his prolific lifetime, the majority
of his titles are conceptually expressed by his use of the conjunction:
"The Public and Its Problems/' "Experience and Nature/' "Democracy
and Education," "Art and Civilization." The emphasis in these titles
does not lie so much on the two topical elements as it does on the "and"
of interpenetrations of the two concepts. Dewey does not assert a
bifurcated philosophy of discrete elements but rather conceptualizes
how the discrete and the continuous interconnect yielding a better
articulated experience.
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Likewise, in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, the "and"
has special importance. The "and" does a lot of work with regards to
denying the conceptuality of a "whole." Multiplicity is at the heart of
Deleuze and Guattari's obsession with the conjunction because any
singularity is always a multiplicity. Therefore, the conjunction exercises
a necessary complexity in any encounter.
AND isn't even a specific conjunction or relation, it brings
in all relations, there are as many relations as ANDS, AND
doesn't just upset all relations, it upsets being, the verb ...
and so on. AND, "and ... and ... and ... " is precisely a
creative stammering, a foreign use of language, as opposed
to a conformist and dominant use of the verb "to be." AND
is of course diversity, multiplicity, the destruction of
identities. (Deleuze 1990, p. 44)
There is a necessity in rhizomatic "anding" to commit to the
complex and non-definitive ways of looking in order to cultivate an
understanding of vision, which induces double vision, or confusionnot unlike Haraway's cyborg who sees multidimensionally. This kind
of commitment to the unclear, the ambiguous in vision, creates room
for those choosing objectification, those rejecting it, those unaware of
its process and those deliberately seeing otherwise. In short, by
dethroning the Cartesian gaze of its unique corner on the perceptual
market, its existence is not disallowed, but rather diminished in power
by promoting multiple ways of perceiving.
However, it is often not desirable or possible to commit to the
confusing state of a milieu composed of multiple choices and multiple
meanings. This very point is the focus of Susan Bordo's essay
"Feminism, Postmodernism and Gender Skepticism" (1993). After
dismissing the "view from nowhere," which she equates with Cartesian
(and male) constriction of the possibilities for knowledge, she equally
refutes a "dream of everywhere" marked by "recognition of interpretive
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multiplicity, of the indeterminacy and heterogeneity of cultural meaning
and meaning-production" (p. 460). She says this not in denial of
perspectival seeing and knowing, but rather:
this is an inescapable fact of human embodiment, as
Nietzsche was the first to point out: "The eye ... in which
the active and interpreting forces, through which alone
seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to be
lacking [is] an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a
perspectival seeing, only a perspectival knowing." This
selectivity, moreover, is never innocent. We always "see"
from points of view that are invested with our social, political
and personal interests, inescapably -centric in one way or
another, even in the desire to do justice to heterogeneity. (p.
463)
Bordo applauds Haraway's conception of the cyborg as an
ambiguous entity but warns against hints of ideal perspectivism from
any position. As indicated in her citation of Nietzsche above, such
perspectivism is unavoidable because that is the very thing which
makes seeing, seeing something, that is to say, meaningful.
Perspectivism is not the problem. Rather, it is our attitude toward
perspectivism that dethrones spectator ideas of knowledge.
With this realization and my desire to hedge against tendencies
for perspectives to become totalizing perspectives, I argue for a
committed attitude to the confusing and the connective so as to more
fully articulate the important role of art education in the rejection of
reductive learning in classrooms and the production instead of an
attitude of openness to difficulty and difference in education generally
and in a democracy more broadly. In William Pope. L's words, I argue
that "people should come to work."
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The Power of Perspective:
Art Crawling and William Pope. L
Performance artist William Pope. L has created art crawls in a
variety of cities across the country drawing attention to what he deems
"the privilege of being a vertical person." On February 1, 2003, Houston,
Texas was the site for such an event, in which William Pope. L, and for
the first time volunteer crawl teams, crawled from Freedman's Town
to Downtown Houston, a 10-block stretch connecting a dilapidated
historic area of Houston's black community with the shiny Houston
skyscrapers, including Enron's now vacant tower.
In an Art Education and Technology class in Spring 2003, I
encouraged my students to attend the art crawl and/ or visit William
Pope. 1's mid-career retrospective at a local art space in order to create
an interpretative slide that would be added to a collective powerpoint
(Fig 1, below, Student's interpretive slide of William Pope. L's Art Crawl
in Houston, Texas). One student who participated in the crawl created

crawling
YOUf progress is·sl'OwGr than you
ever ilt1aghfed.
You ate intImate with Wavlty
Your vllinel'ability is ine !.#Ipable.
You tluctuate betwe(ln
jni ibi lity.

p~tacJe

and

fhink only of-the next few inches.
Vori cm1 n01 bear to think any fimheJ'.
YOll

You accept your p!lin as inevitfible.
'YOll realize that i hurts (00 omc:h to raise
your head, 10 el your sights.

You forget thai you one c{iuldwalk.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Wilson McKay

317

a slide that effectively shared her experience by revealing how
impossible sharing that experience in any way other than experiencing
it could.(lJ
Over a faint background of crawlers approaching towering
downtown, text literally crawled in from the right side of the screen to
surround images of a crawl team and the singular crawling student.
The text invokes the bod y' s intimacy / extension to the street and issues
of vision, stating that the crawler fluctuated between spectacle and
invisibility and a major effect of crawling was the pain associated with
raising your head in order to "set your sights."
In this art crawl, William Pope. L opened up experience to involve
other people quite literally enacting a cyborg extension of the body to
asphalt and the rhizome of the crawl in that each participant became a
singular, yet multiple, grass shoot of the experience. Politically
involving the horizontal bodies collectively, yet mobilizing them
separately, the art crawl opened up experience rupturing the status
quo perceptions of the participants and of the Houston community.
In summary, this experience was one of critical perception-an
experience that invited seeing otherwise and enacted imaginative
possibilities for looking and experiencing in a social realm. Thoughts
were manifested not in the realm of the "what is" but rather in the
realm of the "what could be." William Pope. L's art crawl critiqued the
social constraints of the privilege of verticality giving us cause to see
otherwise, and pause to be otherwise. The revelation of structures of
power challenged our usually distanced vision and enacted a situated,
attitudinally-open, accumulation of views critically looking for
connections.

Resistence, Rupture, Art & Democracy
In the artworld, resistance has always played a major role precisely
because of its critical exhortation of experience: "resistance and conflict
have always been factors in generating art; and they are, as we have
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seen, a necessary part of artistic form" (Dewey 1934, p. 339).
Consequently, "the first stirrings of dissatisfaction and the first
intimations of a better future are always found in works of art" (p.
346). Arresting the spectacle, uprooting the tree, and rupturing the
status quo give art the ability to enact, or at least seriously investigate,
virtualities-the realm of what could be. The lines of flight producing
virtualities begin from blocs, tension, and resistance. Rupture thus
becomes another name for responding in the future to such blockage.
Anything that interrupts the proliferation of seamless experience
ruptures. To enact the capacity to AND is to rupture, and the infinite
variability that inheres in such a capacity is what leads to an active
sense of democracy. In this sense, democracy is never achieved but
constantly in process.
Art plays a crucial role in critically perceiving experience in ways
that activate our ideas of resistance, rupture and democracy. Mapping
art as a rhizome suggests future possibilities while subverting
stagnating ideas of the status quo. Art education, despite its rhizomatic
subject, is one such arena that embodies tendencies to become a tree.
What is necessary is a re-situation, that is to say a mapping of the
connective and ambiguous routes of the rhizome, so as to open up
possibilities for art education in the future.

Rhizomatic Art Education:
Social Theory in a Post-Cartesian World
Dewey (1920/1957) argued that "full education comes only when
there is a responsible share on the part of each person, in proportion to
capacity, in shaping the aims and policies of the social groups to which
he [sic] belongs" (p. 209). The realization of each individual's
connectedness to the benefits and ills of society echoes the results of
critical experience in art education. Openness to such connections is
predicated on the ability to perceive them, and as argued previously,
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this does not generally occur with Cartesian vision. Previously,
democracy was actively positioned, as a verb always in motion.
Education must be similarly conceived. Neither should be conceived
as a fixed locale at which we rest once we are believed to have achieved
them. Rather, democracy and education must constantly vary, change,
connect, and move, as along a rhizome. In such conceptions of
democracy and education, authoritative vision has no place; multiple
perspectives connect to create knowledge and possibility. Rhizomatic
art education cultivates this idea.
Dewey (1916) further exhorts an active understanding of both
education and democracy by pointing out the oppressive results and
abuses of power in a society that does not value or perceive connections:
A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the
distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it
that its members are educated to personal initiative and
adaptability. Otherwise, they will be overwhelmed by the
changes in which they are caught and whose significance
or connections they do not perceive. The result will be a
confusion in which a few will appropriate to themselves
the results of the blind and externally directed activities of
others. (pp. 87-88)
Education in a critical sense has the elimination of such oppressive,
non-democratic ways of life at its core, and connective vision as
exercised in rhizomatic art education plays a crucial role in achieving
such critical education.
The recognition of the intertwining verbing of democracy and
education denies the development of trees in preference for rhizomes.
Such an idea places a premium on education that is connective and
open, ambiguous, imaginative, and dwelling in possibility. Rhizomatic
art education enacts such critical components ever striving toward
democracy and education. However, responsibility for partial visions
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and attitudes toward change and resistance rests with each person
because each of us is "subject to the influence of custom and inertia,
and has to protect himself [/herselfl from its influences by a deliberate
openness to life itself" (Dewey, 1934, p. 304). Rhizomatic art education
enacts such deliberate openness by emphasizing the partiality and
limitations of vision requiring constant re-visioning of imaginative and
connective possibilities.

Conclusion
In her essay" Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's
Artwork Essay Reconsidered" (1992/1997), Susan Buck-Morss explores
Marx's factory model as described by Benjamin (p. 389) and argues
that in this kind of model the "goal is to numb the organism, to deaden
the senses, to repress memory" Cp. 390). She goes on to argue that in
such a "crisis in perception," education's goal must be in "restoring
'perceptibility'" (p. 390). If this is not the agenda of education, BuckMorss exhorts that the eyes see too much and yet see nothing: "Thus,
the simultaneity of overstimulation and numbness ... destroys the
human organism's power to respond politically" (p. 390).
The invocation of the metaphors of the rhizome and the cyborg,
as Docherty (1996) suggests, requires the abandonment of the idea of
education as correction Cp. 81). This means abandoning our usual way
of understanding wherein alterity is reduced to identity characterized
by a "colonization of the space of alterity and the collapsing of that
complex and three-dimensional space into the narrow but reassuring
confines of the two-dimensional and stereotypical mirror" (p. 83). Such
an attitude requires advocacy for the complex, the confusing, the
ambiguous.
The costs of continuing to reduce education to a method of
correction are far-reaching. Continued monocular views of know ledge
in education create a citizenry that is hesitant and unsure of their own
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ability to deal with complex ideas and create hypostasized
understandings of the world, wherein difference is to be feared, not
valued as the basis of democratic life. In conclusion, this essay has
explored the problems inherent in unexamined Cartesian vision and
explicated the ramifications of such vision continuing to function
unchecked. Democracy and education are at stake. Rhizomatic art
education keeps a complexified understanding of vision at the forefront.
Complexified vision enacts the rhizome celebrating its connectedness
and its openness. Such vision requires alternatives to binaries of
domination and submission, subject and object and creates
corresponding attitudes of openness resulting in multiple active
perspectives, aware of their limitations. Such limitations necessitate
the cyborg, the rhizome-a connected understanding of who we are
that is bigger than ourselves. Even though it means more work, viewing
ourselves as connected entities, we see the value of who we are when
we are multiplied, when we value difference, as epitomized in another's
point of view. Only with this kind of re-visioned vision, can we begin
to live in a world where we can go elsewhere, and imagine something
else to be.

Notes
(I)

Thanks to Tria Wood for sharing her slide and her ideas about

the art crawl.
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